The American steel market is part of a global market flooded with Chinese supply. China produces 52% of the world’s steel, or 961 million tonnes, and has 700 million tonnes of excess capacity. The OECD projects that the global surplus will grow from 601 million tonnes in 2025 to 745 million. The United States insulated itself from this pressure with tariffs, but that very insulation made the American market attractive to foreign producers. In recent years, the influence of major foreign companies entering the industry has become increasingly significant.
Japan’s Nippon Steel acquired U.S. Steel, one of the oldest companies in the American steel industry, for $14 billion. The transfer of one of the most prominent symbols of U.S. industrial might to a Japanese producer sparked widespread debate and raised questions about whether a strategic industry should be placed in foreign hands at all. South Korean automaker Hyundai is building a major steel plant in Louisiana and, according to the company’s CEO, intends to supply metal not only to its own factories but also to other American businesses. In doing so, it is moving from steel consumer to producer—and competitor to American companies in their own market.
Brazil’s largest steelmaker, Gerdau, is already well underway with construction of a new plant in Midlothian, Texas. For the Brazilian company, this incursion into a foreign market is just one of many. For American steelmakers, however, Brazil’s growing influence in the industry is a serious threat.
Indian multinational conglomerate Essar received $10 billion in federal funding for a project to build a plant in Iowa with an annual capacity of 7.5 million tonnes. This is no longer merely an attempt to enter the market; it is an incursion backed by money from the U.S. federal budget. That makes it worth taking a close look at exactly whom the United States is welcoming onto its soil.
In fact, Essar is far from a new player in the American market, which is why its history deserves special attention. As early as 2007–2008, the company established itself in Minnesota with plans to build both a plant and a mine. But the project ran into financial difficulties and missed deadlines, eventually going bankrupt in 2016. A court assessed its debts at more than $1 billion. After restructuring, the company re-emerged under the name Mesabi Metallics, but Essar continued to play a role in its management. Critics in Minnesota still cite that failure as evidence of the company’s unreliability. Yet this company—with a substantial track record of bankruptcies and broken promises—continues to receive billions of dollars in financing from American taxpayers. This raises an obvious question: should the United States support a foreign conglomerate that has already let down American creditors and an entire state?
There are, of course, arguments in favor of foreign investment: it creates jobs, adds capacity, and attracts capital. But it is important to remember that a foreign investor’s key decisions are made in the interests of its parent company, not the American economy. A foreign owner views its U.S. plant solely in the context of its global strategy. If closing the plant is the most profitable option, it will close; if the company decides it is better to supply metal from its home country, it will produce it there and ship it to the United States. What’s more, a foreign company can leave at any time, since the American market is not its only market—and certainly not necessarily its main one. Britain’s experience bears this out.
Until the 1890s, Britain was a leader in steelmaking, but it fell far behind during the 20th century. By the early 2000s, only two major steelworks remained: Port Talbot and Scunthorpe. Both were later sold to foreign owners. They initially came under the control of India’s Tata, but Scunthorpe later passed to Chinese producer Jingye. For their foreign owners, British operations were secondary, and that attitude ultimately led Jingye to announce in 2024 that it planned to close the blast furnaces because there was no path to a decent return. Silence followed until early 2025, when the Chinese company quietly left the region, “the English way.” In May, the government nationalized Scunthorpe and renamed it British Steel. But during Jingye’s ownership, the equipment had grown outdated and efficiency had fallen sharply. The operation no longer pays for itself; it survives only to preserve jobs and production at taxpayers’ expense. The problem is not the mere fact that a foreign owner might leave. Rather, a foreign owner entering the market adds capacity the industry did not previously have. As a result, protection designed to shield the industry from external pressure can end up creating pressure from within.
Finally, foreign capacity could flood the market. If all the announced projects—the Hyundai and Gerdau plants and the Essar project—go ahead, goods made by foreign companies on American soil will fill the space left by imports. Demand from the automotive, construction, and defense industries would then need to grow just as quickly. Otherwise, excess capacity will drive prices down, the industry will fall into decline again, and its own success will be to blame.
If the United States’ goal is national economic security, it should focus primarily on domestic producers rather than support a patchwork of foreign investments. Nucor, currently the largest American steel company and the world’s 16th largest as of 2024, for example, ships 15 million tonnes per half-year, is growing its revenue, and operates profitably. U.S. Steel, despite coming under Nippon Steel’s control, continues to produce steel in the country. Other American companies are building and modernizing plants in various states. U.S. producers need a predictable environment and protection from dumping—that is, what tariffs have already provided—as well as confidence that the industry will remain under domestic control.
There are two possible paths. The first is to keep expanding capacity and blindly hope that foreign owners will act responsibly. The second is to build a system in which foreign investors can enter the market only on the condition that they maintain and modernize production, while the development of downstream industries is prioritized. That way, market protection will not become a subsidy for foreign producers, and tariffs will not end up strengthening foreign industry.
This case study of the American steel industry is instructive for two reasons. First, having undergone deindustrialization, America is increasingly sliding toward the position of a developing country that depends on foreign investment to sustain its own economy. Second, a lagging developing economy needs stronger, more systematic government support—not only through subsidies and incentives for foreign investors, but also through strategic industrial and inter-industry development policies that include a multi-level range of regulatory tools, both indirect (incentive-based) and direct (administrative).
* — We apologize to our learned readers, but in case it is needed, we recall that the famous line about Greeks bearing gifts comes from the Aeneid by the Roman poet Virgil. It was spoken by the Trojan priest Laocoön, who tried to persuade his fellow citizens not to bring into Troy the enormous wooden horse left by the Greeks (the Danaans) besieging the city.